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During the past two decades, the California Supreme Court has
led the nation's courts in creating new paths for tort recovery by in-
jured victims.' In the area of negligent infliction of emotional distress,
2
however, the court's holdings have appeared chaotic. While the court
has dramatically expanded this tort cause of action, establishing itself
as the leader here, as elsewhere, in tort law, it has also analyzed emo-
tional distress in a manner that flatly contradicts these liability-ex-
panding holdings. The consequence has been confusion among
lawyers, judges, and commentators who perceive a California case law
in disarray. This Article, however, will suggest the means to bring or-
der to this apparent disarray.
In 1968, in Dillon v. Legg,3 California became the first American
jurisdiction to hold that a mother who witnesses the negligent infliction
of death or injury to her child may recover for her emotional trauma
and accompanying physical injury even though she was not within the
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1. See Ursin, Judicial Creativity and Tort Law, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 229, 295
(1981).
2. In this Article, the language of negligence is used because that is the manner in
which this tort cause of action usually is discussed. An action for emotional distress, how-
ever, may arise in circumstances in which the basis of liability is not negligence. See, e.g.,
Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1977) (bystander emo-
tional distress recoverable in strict products liability).
3. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968), overruling Amaya v. Home
Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513,29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963). InAmaya, the
California Supreme Court had adhered to the zone-of-danger rule.
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zone of physical danger. Prior to Dillon, American courts had uni-
formly required that recovery for emotional distress be based on a fear
for plaintiff's own safety because of his or her presence within the zone
of physical injury.4 Breaking from this traditional stance, Dillon al-
lowed recovery for a "bystander" plaintiff, who is not within the zone
of physical danger but who witnesses an accident and as a result suffers
shock that is manifested in physical injury.
The Dillon opinion emphasized the primary importance of fore-
seeability in establishing liability.5 Emotional distress is foreseeable
when a mother witnesses the negligently caused death or injury of her
child, even if the mother is not herself physically endangered. From
this perspective, the court concluded that the Dillon facts exposed the
"hopeless artificiality of the zone-of-danger rule' 6 and thus afforded an
ideal backdrop for the rule's internment. Both Mrs. Dillon and her
daughter, Cheryl, witnessed the automobile accident that resulted in
the death of Mrs. Dillon's infant daughter, Erin. While Cheryl may
have been within the zone of risk, her mother admittedly was not. The
trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state
a cause of action with respect to Mrs. Dillon's claim and denied such a
motion with respect to Cheryl's claim. In reversing the trial court dis-
missal of Mrs. Dillon's cause of action, the California Supreme Court
criticized the zone-of-danger rule, which would justify the trial court's
rulings on these motions "merely because of a happenstance that the
sister was some few yards closer to the accident."7
The significance of Dillon's expansion of liability has been widely
noted.8 Dillon has become the leading exposition of the desirability of
expanded liability for emotional distress; when other courts have con-
sidered the bystander issue, Dillon has provided the justification and
methodology for extending recovery beyond the traditional zone-of-
4. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 334 (4th ed. 1971); see, e.g., Webb v.
Francis J. Lewald Coal Co., 214 Cal. 182, 4 P.2d 532 (1931); Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal.
298, 176 P. 440 (1918); Vanoni v. Western Airlines, 247 Cal. App. 2d 793, 56 Cal. Rptr. 115
(1967); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 (2) (1965). See generally Annot.,
29 A.L.R. 3d 1337 (1970).
5. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739-41, 441 P.2d 912, 919-20, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79-80 (1968).
6. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 733, 441 P.2d 912, 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 75 (1968).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA CITIZENS' COMMISSION ON TORT REFORM, RIGHTING THE
LIABILITY BALANCE: REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA CITIZENS' COMMISSION ON TORT RE-
FORM 62 (1977): "Among all the celebrated tort decisions in the history of British and
American law, many feel that this ruling qualifies as the highest priority yet achieved by the
goal of compensation of the injured, as opposed to other objectives in the tort system.".
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danger rule.9 Even courts reluctant to extend recovery beyond the zone
of danger have recognized the importance of the Dillon opinion in ana-
lyzing the policy considerations. 10
While Dillon remains a landmark of expanded liability for emo-
tional distress, California case law has taken a surprising turn. A re-
cent court of appeal case is illustrative. In Hathaway v. Superior
Court," plaintiff parents emerged from a house within minutes after
their son had touched an electrically charged evaporative cooler. The
parents saw their six-year old son lying in a puddle of water, gagging
and spitting up. Although the boy had a recognizable pulse, efforts to
revive him failed, and the parents watched their son in a "dying
state." 2 The court of appeal held that the parents had no cause of
action for their emotional distress. Their son was no longer gripping
the water cooler and receiving the electrical charge as they observed
him writhing on the ground.' 3 This holding might be seen as the prod-
uct of an aberrant court of appeal, undoubtedly unsympathetic to Dil-
lon in particular, and to the general drift of California tort law; the
"happenstance" that the boy no longer was touching the cooler seems
as "hopelessly artificial" a basis for denying recovery for the foresee-
able emotional distress to the parents as was the fact that Mrs. Dillon
was a few yards further from the accident than her daughter, Cheryl.
Nevertheless, the Hathaway court was confident in its assertion that its
decision was representative of a "steady flow" of appellate decisions in
California.
14
California tort law governing recovery for emotional distress ap-
pears chaotic, and one source of this chaos is Justus v. 4tchison,' 5 a
9. See, e.g., D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 31 Conn. Supp. 164, 326 A.2d 129
(1973); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Barnhill v. Davis, 300
N.W.2d 104 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1981); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295
(1978); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979); Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417
A.2d 521 (1980); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979); D'Ambra v. United States,
114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975); Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
10. When the New York Court of Appeals in Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249
N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y. Supp. 554 (1969), refused to extend recovery beyond the zone of dan-
ger, the court acknowledged the importance of the Dillon opinion and of the preceding Cali-
fornia opinion in Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29
Cal. Rptr. 33 (1969), overruled by Dillon, which had adhered to the zone-of-danger rule, in
analyzing the policy factors. See text accompanying notes 149-55 infra.
11. 112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1980).
12. Id at 731, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
13. Id.
14. Id at 734, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
15. 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977); see Levy & Ursin, Tort Law
in Californr At the Crossroads, 67 CALiF. L. Rnv. 497 (1979).
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1977 California Supreme Court decision. The Justus court held that a
father who suffered shock as a result of watching the negligent delivery
of his stillborn infant could not recover under Dillon for his emotional
distress. The Justus opinion appears to have repudiated Dillon's meth-
odology and underlying premises. Dillon allowed recovery based on an
analysis that imposed an obligation when the traumatic reaction of the
plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. While recogniz-
ing that "no immutable rule can establish the extent of that obligation
for every circumstance of the future," 16 the Dillon court ventured to
define guidelines to aid future resolution of the issue of duty based on
foreseeability.' 7 In Justus, the risk of danger to the plaintiff appeared
foreseeable, satisfying the general criterion of liability espoused in Dil-
lon. Nevertheless, the court denied relief, imposing as a prerequisite to
recovery factors that in Dillon had been advanced only as guidelines to
be considered in determining the issue of foreseeability. 18 Justus seems
to require in emotional distress cases an analysis as arbitrary as that
employed under the discredited zone-of-danger concept.
The renewed skepticism towards awards for emotional distress ap-
parent in Justus was absent, however, in the California Supreme
Court's holding in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals.'9 In Molien,
the court returned to the Dillon emphasis on the "general principle of
foreseeability" in sanctioning recovery for emotional distress for a hus-
band whose wife had been negligently misdiagnosed as having syphilis.
Although this holding and rationale appear to undercut Justus, the
court nevertheless purported to reaffirm Justus's restrictive treatment of
bystander cases.20 At the same time, however, the Molien court further
expanded the emotional distress action by holding, in a departure from
prior California law,2' that a plaintiff who suffers no physical injuries
may nevertheless state a cause of action for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress if that emotional distress is foreseeable and "serious.
'22
This Article suggests that coherence can be found in the appar-
ently chaotic California tort law governing recovery for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress. First, the Article examines the California
16. 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
17. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
18. Compare Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80 with
Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d at 582, 565 P.2d at 135, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
19. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
20. Id at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
21. Id. at 924-25, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835-36 (citing Sloane v. Southern
Cal. Ry., 111 Cal. 668, 44 P. 320 (1896); BAJI No. 12.80 (6th ed. 1977)).
22. Id at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
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case law, including both the apparent fluctuation in the California
Supreme Court's attitude, as indicated by Dillon, Justus, and Molien,
and the impact of this fluctuation on lower court decisions in Califor-
nia. This analysis reveals that, contrary to the implications of Dillon,
California courts have created an analytically complex regime of arbi-
trary rules restricting recovery for foreseeable emotional distress.. Sec-
ond, the Article probes the underlying issues of policy that have
plagued the California Supreme Court in its attempt to create a ra-
tional doctrine in this area, concluding that the complexity and arbi-
trariness of California emotional distress law can be traced to the
court's initial failure to comprehend fully these difficult issues of policy
and to its subsequent attempts to meet these issues by incremental ad-
justments to its Dillon holding. Once California case law is understood
from this policy perspective, Dillon, Justus, and Molien emerge as con-
structive steps in the articulation and resolution of the difficult and sub-
tle policy issues raised by tort actions for emotional distress.
Dillon, Justus, and Molien
The Dillon Landmark
For the California Supreme Court, recognition of a cause of action
for plaintiffs such as Mrs. Dillon, who suffered emotional distress al-
though outside the zone of danger, was a compelling proposition.
Thus, in Dillon v. Legg,23 the court critically examined the concept of
duty, the widely accepted basis for judicial rejection of such claims.24
To the court, the duty concept was "not an old and deep-rooted doc-
trine but a legal device of the latter half of the nineteenth century
designed to curtail the feared propensities of juries toward liberal
awards."'25 In assessing whether the tortfeasor owed a duty to the
mother, the court quoted Dean Prosser for the proposition that, be-
cause the essential question is "'whether the plaintiffs interests are en-
titled to legal protection against the defendant's conduct,' "the concept
of duty represents "'a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in it-
self."' Duty should be recognized as "'only an expression of the sum
total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.' "26 In prior cases similar to
Dillon, duty rules had been developed to deny liability because of
23. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
24. Id at 730, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
25. Id at 734, 441 P.2d at 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
26. Id (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 332-33 (3d
ed. 1964)).
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"twin fears that courts [would] be flooded with an onslaught of
(1) fraudulent and (2) indefinable claims. '27 The Dillon court con-
cluded that "neither fear [is] justified."
28
As to fraudulent claims, the court admonished that the possibility
of some fraudulent claims "does not justify a wholesale rejection of the
entire class of claims in which the potentiality arises." 29 Each case
should be decided by the jury or trial court on its own merits. To do
otherwise would "destroy the public's confidence .. .by using the
broad broom of 'administrative convenience' to sweep away a class of
claims a number of which are admittedly meritorious. ' 30 In addition,
the court doubted that the problem of fraudulent claims is substantially
more pronounced in cases like Dillon than in cases in which a plaintiff
fears for his or her own safety or collects damages for mental suffering
when the mental injury is an aggravation of, or "parasitic" to, an estab-
lished tort.31 The court concluded that "we cannot let the difficulties of
adjudication frustrate the principle that there be a remedy for every
substantial wrong."
32
As to indefinable claims, the court found unconvincing the argu-
ment that "definition of liability being impossible, denial of liability is
the only realistic alternative. ' 33 The court asserted that "proper guide-
lines can indicate the extent of liability" for different fact situations
presented in future cases.34 The court emphasized the primary impor-
tance of foreseeability of risk in establishing the element of duty in the
absence of overriding policy considerations. 35 The court cautioned,
however, that "[b]ecause it is inherently intertwined with foreseeability
such duty or obligation must necessarily be adjudicated only upon a
case-by-case basis."' 36 No "immutable rule" would suffice to define the
extent of a defendant's obligation in every situation.
37
Limiting its holding to a case in which the plaintiff suffered shock
27. Id at 735, 441 P.2d at 917, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77. The dissent saw the infinite liability
argument as the true basis of the traditional duty rule. Id at 751-52, 441 P.2d at 928, 69 Cal.
Rptr. at 88 (Burke, J., dissenting). The majority, however, summarily rejected this argu-
ment. See notes 138-40 & accompanying text infra.
28. id at 735, 441 P.2d at 917, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
29. Id at 736, 441 P.2d at 917-18, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78.
30. Id at 737, 441 P.2d at 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
31. Id at 737-38, 441 P.2d at 918-19, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78-79.
32. Id at 739, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
33. Id at 730, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
34. Id at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
35. Id at 739-40, 441 P.2d at 919-20, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.




resulting in physical injury, the court listed the following factors to be
taken into account by courts in assessing the degree of foreseeability of
emotional injury to plaintiff. (1) whether the plaintiff was located near
the scene of the accident or was a distance away from it; (2) whether
the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon the plaintiff
from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident or
from learning of the accident from others after its occurrence; and
(3) whether the plaintiff and the victim were closely related or there
was an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant
relationship.38
Dillon through Justus: Guides to Foreseeability Become Duty Limitations
The approach of the Dillon court, emphasizing the determination
of foreseeability on a case-by-case basis, 39 seemed to ensure that the
Dillon holding would not be the last word.40 Courts adopting its ap-
proach are encouraged to recognize liability whenever emotional dis-
tress is foreseeable, and the Dillon guidelines suggest an analysis to
determine foreseeability. Couched in their comparative language
rather than phrased as threshold requirements for recovery, the factors
Dillon advanced as indicative of foreseeability were intended to be in-
terpreted flexibly to ensure that liability is coincident with foreseeabil-
ity.41 The emphasis on foreseeability suggests also that liability might
be extended beyond the guidelines themselves. Although under the
facts of Dillon the plaintiff was near the scene of the accident, contem-
poraneously observed the accident, and was closely related to the vic-
tim of the accident, the court recognized that "facts more subtle than
the compelling ones alleged in the [Dillon] complaint" would create a
38. Id at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
39. See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
40. For example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1978 followed Dillon
in Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1975), abandoning the zone-of-
danger rule with a foreseeability analysis that paralleled Dillon: "Reasonable foreseeability
is a proper starting point in determining whether an actor is to be liable for the consequences
of his negligence." Id at 567, 380 N.E.2d at 1302. The Massachusetts court took an expan-
sive view of this approach, holding that a cause of action is stated "where the parent either
witnesses the accident or soon comes on the scene while the child is still there." Id Then, in
1980 the Massachusetts court went even further, holding in Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's
Sons, - Mass. -, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980), that a cause of action exists even when the plain-
tiff first saw the injuries in the hospital. Foreseeability again was the premise: "A plaintiff
who rushes onto the accident scene and finds a loved one injured has no greater entitlement
to compensation for that shock than a plaintiff who rushes instead to the hospital. So long as
the shock follows closely on the heels of the accident, the two types of injuries are equally
foreseeable." Id at -, 413 N.E.2d at 697.
41. 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
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necessity for courts in future cases to draw lines of demarcation "in the
absence or reduced weight of some of the [Dillon] factors.
'42
Since its decision in Dillon, the California Supreme Court has
twice taken the opportunity to discuss extensively the Dillon guidelines.
In both cases, the court's analysis focused primarily on the second Dil-
lon factor, "[w]hether the shock resulted from a direct emotional im-
pact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance
of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others
after its occurrence.
'43
The first of these cases, the 1977 decision in Krouse v. Graham,
44
seemed to point to an expansive interpretation of Dillon. In Krouse,
the plaintiff husband was sitting in the driver's seat of his parked car
while his wife removed groceries from the back seat. The defendant's
car suddenly approached the plaintiff's car from the rear at high speed,
straddled the curb, and struck and killed plaintiff's wife before collid-
ing with the parked car. The plaintiff sought recovery for his physical
injuries and emotional distress "resulting from his presence at the acci-
dent scene, and his perception of [his wife's] death. '45 The California
Supreme Court in Krouse held that a Dillon cause of action could be
sustained even though the plaintiff neither saw his wife being struck by
the defendant's car nor immediately observed the effect of the impact
upon her.46 The court noted first that Dillon "emphasized the primary
nature of the element of foreseeability in establishing the essential in-
gredient of a duty of due care."'47 The court then noted with approval
the appellate court decision in Archibald v. Braverman ,48 which it said
had extended recovery to the mother of a child injured by an explosion
in which the mother "'did not actually witness the tort but viewed the
child's injuries within moments after the occurrence of the injury pro-
ducing event.' "49 The Krouse court approved the holding of Archibald
that the "Dillon requirement of 'sensory and contemporaneous obser-
vance of the accident' does not require a visual perception of the im-
pact causing the death or injury."'50 The court then explained why the
42. Id, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr at 81.
43. Id at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
44. 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977).
45. Id at 74, 562 P.2d at 1029, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
46. Id at 74-75, 562 P.2d at 1029-30, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 870-71.
47. Id. at 75, 562 P.2d at 1030, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
48. 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
49. 19 Cal. 3d at 76, 562 P.2d at 1031, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 872 (emphasis the court's)




facts of Krouse also satisfied this guideline:
Although [the plaintif] did not see [his wife] struck by defendant's
automobile, he fully perceived the fact that she had been so struck,
for he knew her position an instant before the impact, observed de-
fendant's vehicle approach her at high speed on a collision course,
and realized that defendant's car must have struck her. Clearly,
under such circumstances [the plaintiff] must be deemed a percipient
witness to the impact causing [his wife's] catastrophic injuries.51
Thus, the court determined that one could perceive an accident without
a visual perception of the impact causing the injuries.
The Krouse court's liberal treatment of the "contemporaneous ob-
servance" guideline, together with its emphasis on foreseeability and its
endorsement of Archibald, might have signalled a further expansion of
the Dillon cause of action. An obvious next step would have been for
the California Supreme Court to allow recovery for emotional distress
caused by witnessing immediately after an accident the severe injuries
experienced by a loved one.52 Instead, in Justus v. Atchison,53 the
51. Id (emphasis added).
52. Krouse and Archibald, read together, can be seen to approve of the extension of
recovery to one who was not physically at the scene of the accident when the accident oc-
curred and did not actually witness the injury-producing event. See 19 Cal. 3d at 76, 562
P.2d at 1031, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 872; 275 Cal. App.2d at 255, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 724. The Krouse
court did emphasize the propriety of the "expression" in Archibald that a "visual perception
of the impact" was not required, thereby hinting that a perception of the event by senses
other than sight might still be required. 19 Cal. 3d at 76, 562 P.2d at 1031, 137 Cal. Rptr. at
872. Nevertheless, the Krouse opinion emphasized the language in Archibald that the
mother did not actually witness the tort "but viewed the child's injuries within moments
after the occurrence of the injury-producing event." Id (emphasis deleted). The supreme
court's focus on this language could have been interpreted to indicate that persons arriving
at the scene of the accident shortly after its occurrence would be allowed to recover even if
they had not sensorily perceived the injury-producing event.
The reasoning of the court of appeal in Archibald, holding that the shock sustained
must be "fairly contemporaneous" with the accident, supports such a conclusion. The court
stated: "Manifestly, the shock of seeing a child severely injured immediately after the tor-
tious event may be just as profound as that experienced in witnessing the accident itself."
275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 256, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723, 725 (1969).
The Krouse court's analysis of two other decisions imposing "temporal limitations" on
the Dillon requirement that the injury result from the sensory and contemporaneous obser-
vance of the accident is not in conflict with this interpretation of Krouse. The court noted
that, in Deboe v. Horn, 16 Cal. App. 3d 221, 94 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1971), '.'the court denied
recovery to a wife who was not present at the scene of the accident and was unaware of her
husband's injury until summoned to the hospital emergency room." Krouse v. Graham, 19
Cal. 3d at 76, 562 P.2d at 1031, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 872. Deboe seems easily distinguishable
from a factual setting involving a person arriving at the scene of the accident shortly after its
occurrence. The shock sustained in Deboe seems more likely to have been caused by learn-
ing of the accident from others after its occurrence than from any sensory and contempora-
neous observance of the accident itself and thus seems to fall outside of Dillon's second
factor.
In Powers v. Sissoev, 39 Cal. App. 3d 865, 114 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1979), the court refused
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court's second opinion addressing the Dillon guidelines, the court re-
treated to a literal and narrow interpretation of the guidelines.
Presaging this shift by the California Supreme Court was an ap-
pellate opinion rendered shortly after Krouse. In Arauz v. Gerhardt,
54
the court of appeal noted that, according to Krouse, visual perception
of the impact causing death was not essential. Nevertheless, the court
emphasized that "some type of sensory perception of the impact con-
temporaneous with the accident is necessary to meet the Dillon require-
ment." 55 In Arauz, the mother arrived at the scene of the accident
within five minutes after the collision that had injured her son. The
court denied recovery because she was neither at the scene of the acci-
dent at the time of impact nor near enough to perceive the impact con-
temporaneously. The Arauz court distinguished Archibald, stating that
in Archibald "it can be inferred that the mother heard the explosion,"
thus having a sensory observance of it.56 The court thus declined the
opportunity to extend Dillon to situations in which a parent witnesses a
child's pain a few minutes after the accident. In so doing, it ignored the
emphasis in Dillon and Krouse on foreseeability, and made recovery
dependent on strict compliance with the Dillon guideline.
In Justus v. Atchison,57 the California Supreme Court, turning
away from Dillon and Krouse, adopted the approach initiated in Arauz
by strictly interpreting the "contemporaneous observance" criterion.
The Justus court characterized Krouse as holding that, "although the
husband did not actually see his wife being struck by the defendant's
car, he nevertheless perceived the event by other than visual means.5 8
recovery "to a parent who first learned of the child's injury 30 to 60 minutes after the acci-
dent." Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d at 76, 562 P.2d at 1031, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 872. While
seemingly presenting a case closer to that in which a person arrives at the scene of the
accident shortly after its occurrence, it is instructive to note that the Powers court refused to
extend recovery "to a case such as this where the shock . . resulted from seeing the daugh-
ter 30 to 60 minutes after the accident and thereafter under circumstances not materially
different from those undergone by every parent whose child has been injured in a nonob-
served and antecedent accident." 39 Cal. App. 3d at 874, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 874. The specter
of limitless liability resulting from extending recovery in cases such as Powers affords ample
explanation for the supreme court's distinction of Powers from Archibald. Thus, the court's
treatment of Powers does not undermine the argument that Krouse and Archibald together
might be interpreted to permit recovery to persons arriving at the scene of the accident
shortly after its occurrence.
53. 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
54. 68 Cal. App. 3d 937, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1977).
55. Id at 949, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
56. Id at 948, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
57. 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
58. Id at 583, 565 P.2d at 134, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 109 (quoting Krouse v. Graham, 19
Cal. 3d at 76, 562 P.2d at 1031, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 872); see text accompanying note 51 supra.
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The Justus court also accepted theArauz gloss onArchibald, character-
izing Archibald as a case in which the mother had contemporaneously
heard the explosion.5 9 In so doing, the court declined the opportunity
to draw upon the expansive implications of Dillon, Krouse, and Archi-
bald. Justus makes it clear that a plaintiff must see, hear or otherwise
sensorily and contemporaneously perceive the injury-producing event
to recover.60 Thus, the California Supreme Court in Justus appeared to
foreclose recovery by persons who witness injuries shortly after their
infliction.
The significance of Justus, however, extends beyond its rejection of
Dillon's applicability to persons arriving shortly after an accident. The
Justus court converted the "contemporaneous observance" guideline
into an analytically complex duty limitation posing significant hurdles
for future plaintiffs. Justus involved claims by fathers who suffered
shock as a result of watching the negligent delivery of their stillborn
infants. In each case, the plaintiff husband was present in the delivery
room in close proximity to his wife.6' Among the disturbing events
witnessed were "the manipulation of the fetus with forceps and by
hand, . . . the emergency procedures performed . . . in connection
with the attempted Caesarian section,.. . the diminution of the fetal
heart tones,. . . the nurse's anxiety at her inability to monitor them,
.. . the prolapsing of the umbilical cord of the fetus. .. and the pain
and trauma of his wife. Finally, each [plaintiff husband]. . . was pres-
ent when the attending physician announced that the fetus had died."'62
At issue in Justus was the Dillon guideline, inquiring "[w]hether
the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from
the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as con-
trasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence." 6
3
This guideline was designed to assist in determining the foreseeability
of emotional distress to the plaintiff. The facts of Justus indicate that
the plaintiff husband's distress was foreseeable: the accidental death of
the fetus occurred during the allegedly negligent attempted delivery;
the plaintiff observed this unfortunate accident; as a consequence, the
plaintiff suffered shock and emotional distress.
The Justus court eschewed this straight-forward foreseeability
analysis and held instead that the facts did not create a cause of action
59. Id.
60. Id at 584, 565 P.2d at 135, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
61. Id
62. Id
63. 68 CaL 2d 728, 740-41, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 CaL Rptr. 72, 80 (1968).
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because the plaintiff husband's anxiety "did not ripen into the disabling
shock which resulted from the death of the fetus until he was actually
informed of that event by the doctor."64 Characterizing the plaintiff
husband as a "passive spectator" who had no way of knowing that the
fetus had died prior to that moment, the court concluded that the shock
"derived not from what he saw and heard during the attempted deliv-
ery, but from what he was told after the fact' 65 The court noted:
Here, although each plaintiff was in attendance at the death of the
fetus, that event was by its very nature hidden from his contempora-
neous perception: he could not see ... nor otherwise sense [the in-
jury to the victim] as in Archibald or Krouse. To put it another way,
he had been admitted to the theater but the drama was being played
on a different stage.
66
Based on this interpretation of the sequence of events, the court con-
cluded that "a shock caused by 'learning of the accident from others
after its occurrence' will not support a cause of action under Dillon."67
Thus, in an action governed by Dillon, a plaintiff must see or
otherwise sense the victim's injury. Although the Justus plaintiff had
sensorily perceived by sight and sound all observable physical minis-
trations of the doctor that led to the death of the fetus, and foreseeably
suffered emotional distress, recovery was denied because the plaintiff
"could not see the injury to the victim. ' 68 In requiring that a plaintiff
see or otherwise sense the injury to the victim, Justus appears to require
understanding by the plaintiff of the nature of the injuries being suf-
fered by the victim while they are initially being suffered.69 Physical
presence at the scene of the accident and sensory observation of the
injury-producing event was not sufficient. Under Justus, a plaintiff
could recover only if he or she appreciated, at the time of death of the
fetus, that the fetus had died.
The court's analysis is flawed. It is artificial in its speculation that
the plaintiff's disabling shock occurred only at the moment the plaintiff
was informed of the death of the fetus. More realistically, this shock
began as anxiety caused by the plaintiff's observation of the injury-pro-
ducing event. This anxiety undoubtedly increased as the situation
worsened, eventually becoming disabling shock. Fundamentally, the
64. Id. at 584-85, 565 P.2d at 135-36, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 110-11.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 583-84, 565 P.2d at 135, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
67. Id (quoting Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80);
see also Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal. App. 3d 937, 949, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619, 627 (1977).
68. 19 Cal. 3d at 584, 565 P.2d at 135, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
69. See, e.g., Nazaroffv. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 563, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657,
662 (1978) (referring to plaintiff in Justus as "not fully comprehend[ing]" the event).
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court's analysis alters the Dillon guideline, which it purports to inter-
pret. The Dillon court asked whether shock resulted from "contempo-
raneous observance of the accident,' ' 70 and did not speak of the
observance of the victim's injury. If one defines the "accident" in Jus-
tus as the unsuccessful delivery of the fetus, then the plaintiff would
seem to fall within the guideline because his emotional distress was
caused by his "contemporaneous observance of the accident."' 71 This
definition and conclusion conform to Dillon's assertion that foreseeabil-
ity of the risk is of primary importance in determining the existence of
a duty.72 A father foreseeably may suffer emotional distress as a result
of watching the delivery of his stillborn infant. In contrast to Dillon's
approach and the language of its guideline, Justus requires that a plain-
tiff perceive the injury, that is, the death, of the fetus at the actual mo-
ment that the fetus died in utero. Apart from a plaintiff who because of
medical training or other unusual circumstances is capable of diagnos-
ing intrauterine fetal death,73 a plaintiff suffering emotional distress as
a consequence of witnessing a stillbirth will probably be unable to re-
cover after Justus, although the emotional distress is foreseeable.
According to Justus, a plaintiff, regardless of foreseeability, has no
cause of action unless he or she meets the following requirements:
(1) the plaintiff must see, hear, or otherwise sensorily perceive the in-
jury producing event; (2) the plaintiff must perceive the receipt of the
injuries by the victim; (3) moreover, these perceptions must be sub-
stantially contemporaneous with the occurrence of both the event and
the initial experiencing of the injuries by the victim; (4) the plaintiff
must also in fact understand the nature of the injuries being suffered by
70. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1977) (emphasis
added).
71. Id
72. Ad at 739-40, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
73. Such unusual circumstances permitted the court in Austin v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 89 Cal. App. 3d 354, 152 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1979), to find that a father witnessing an
intrauterine death during delivery had stated a cause of action for emotional distress. The
plaintif's wife died prior to the delivery of the unborn child. "[A]fter her death, plaintiff,
who was in the delivery room, was able to feel life in the as yet unborn child; he asked the
attending physician and nurses to deliver the child but they refused; the child died, and
plaintiff was able to ascertain the death by feeling the wife's body." Id at 357, 152 Cal.
Rptr. at 421. The court found .ustuw "inapplicable" because the father inAustin alleged that
he "learned of the death by his own observation of the cessation of life in the fetus and that
his shock and distress were occasioned by that sensory and contemporaneous realization of
the death." Id at 358, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 422. The allegations in the plaintiffs complaint
upon which the majority distinguished Justus asserted that "upon the death of the plaintiff's
wife in the hospital without prior delivery of the unborn child, 'plaintiff and defendants saw
and felt the unborn child move' and that 'the unborn baby then died without being born
while plaintiff and defendants were present."' [d at 360, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
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the victim; and (5) this understanding must derive from the sensory
and substantially contemporaneous perception of the event. Justus
thus repudiates Dillon by reformulating the Dillon contemporaneous
observance guideline and, contrary to the focus of Dillon, converting
this "guideline" into an inflexible duty limitation on recovery for fore-
seeable emotional distress rather than considering it as a "factor" rele-
vant to determining whether emotional distress was foreseeable.
74
Dillon's benign guideline has become a complex analytical labyrinth
that may severely restrict recovery in future emotional distress cases.
In addition to its liability-limiting treatment of the Dillon guide-
line,75 Justus may also have imposed additional requirements that a
plaintiff must meet in an emotional distress action. The first require-
ment is that a plaintiff's emotional distress must derive from perception
of an accident that can be characterized as a "relatively sudden occur-
rence."' 76 This additional requirement arose in the context of the Justus
court's discussion of a court of appeal decision, Jansen v. Children's
Hospital Medical Center.77 In Jansen, a mother had watched the slow
but progressive deterioration and ultimate death of her hospitalized
child, allegedly caused by negligent misdiagnosis. The court of appeal
held that Dillon was inapplicable because there was no "sudden and
brief event" that caused the child's injury and that could "be the sub-
ject of sensory perception" by the mother.78 The California Supreme
Court in Justus appeared to approve of the Jansen analysis.79 It rea-
soned, however, that the Justus facts presented a "closer case" than
Jansen and could be distinguished from Jansen because the accident in
Justus "was a relatively sudden occurrence." 80 Thus, after Justus it can
be argued that, to state a cause of action under Dillon, the plaintiff must
74. See 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. See text accompanying
notes 41-42 supra.
75. See text accompanying notes 57-74 supra. Arguably, the restrictive application of
Dillon guidelines in Justus extends beyond the Justus court's reformulation of the contem-
poraneous observance guideline. As another of its guidelines, the Dillon court had inquired
into "[wihether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident, as contrasted with one
who was a distance away from it." Id In Justus, the court restated that factor as "whether
the plaintiff was present at the scene of the accident." 19 Cal. 3d at 582, 565 P.2d at 135, 139
Cal. Rptr. at 110. In applying this factor to the facts in Justus, the court referred to it as a
requirement of "physical presence." Id Thus, Justus may be interpreted as having con-
verted the Dillon factor of nearness to the accident scene into a requirement that plaintiff be
present at the scene.
76. 19 Cal. 3d at 584, 565 P.2d at 135, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
77. 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1973).
78. Id at 24, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
79. 19 Cal. 3d at 583, 565 P.2d at 135, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
80. Id at 584, 565 P.2d at 135, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
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allege sensory perception of an accident that is a relatively sudden
occurrence.
The second requirement possibly imposed on Dillon-based actions
after Justus is that the plaintiff be an involuntary witness to the acci-
dent. In assessing the merit of the plaintiff's claim in Justus, the court
stated:
[Ifn the context of this case reliance on Dillon seems particularly in-
appropriate. . . . By its nature the Dillon cause of action presup-
poses that the plaintiff was an involuntary witness to the accident.
Yet here, although the complaints are silent on the point, we must
assume that each husband was in the delivery room by his own
choice.81
The court in Justus was not forced to find against the plaintiff based
upon this "involuntary witness" criterion because it had previously de-
cided that the plaintiff had failed to meet the "contemporaneous obser-
vance" requirement. In cases in which a plaintiff voluntarily exposes
himself or herself to the risk of emotional distress, however, the courts
may be less sympathetic to demands for compensation for emotional
distress.8 2
In summary, Justus repudiates the underlying premises and meth-
odological approach of Dillon. The Dillon guidelines no longer serve
as aids to determining foreseeability; they have been transformed into
rigid, narrowly construed duty limitations on liability for foreseeable
harm. Moreover, Justus suggests additional requirements that a plain-
tiff must meet in an emotional distress action. If Justus guides Califor-
nia courts in future cases, the consequence may be that, in practice,
California courts will not impose liability any more extensively than
courts in zone-of-danger jurisdictions.
The Aftermath of Justus
Two cases decided after Justus by California appellate courts illus-
trate the chaotic state of California tort law governing actions for emo-
81. Id at 585, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. at I11.
82. See Austin v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 89 Cal. App. 3d 354, 361, 152 Cal. Rptr.
420, 423 (1979) (Jefferson, J., dissenting in part). At least one court has erected an "involun-
tary witness" rule from the Justus opinion. In Cortez v. Macias, 110 Cal. App. 3d 640, 167
Cal. Rptr. 905 (1980), plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against a doctor whose
alleged malpractice caused the death of plaintiffs' two-week old son. Based on Molien v.
Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980), discussedin
text accompanying notes 19-22 supra, Mrs. Cortez brought a second action against the doc-
tor for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Cortez court noted that Justus had
determined that "a voluntary witness is denied any right of recovery for emotional distress."
110 Cal. App. 3d at 650, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
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tional distress. Each case involved the contemporaneous observance
duty limitation. The first of these cases, Nazaroff v. Superior Court,
8 3
demonstrates that Justus has not completely vitiated Dillon's expansive
approach, but also makes clear how difficult it is today for courts to
follow Dillon's lead. In Nazaroff, the mother of a three-year old infant
sought recovery for physical injuries allegedly caused by emotional dis-
tress suffered from witnessing her son being pulled from a swimming
pool and from participating in the unsuccessful attempts to revive him.
The mother had been searching for her son when she heard a scream
from her neighbor's backyard. The plaintiff attested:
I immediately had the dreadful knowledge that Danny had somehow
gotten into the Becker's swimming pool and he was hurt .... I im-
mediately ran toward the pool, and as I was running I saw a person
... pulling Danny from the pool .... By the time I arrived at the
pool edge, Nancy Akers had commenced mouth-to-mouth resuscita-
tion. I immediately pushed her aside and commenced mouth-to-
mouth resuscitation and heart thumping .... 84
Despite the fact that the mother arrived on the scene after the injury-
producing event, the Nazaroff court held that these facts stated a cause
of action for emotional distress.
The Nazaroff court recognized both that the harm to the Nazaroff
plaintiff was foreseeable and that Dillon urged that foreseeability
should be of prime concern. The court clearly was sympathetic to an
expansive reading of Dillon, quoting at length from Dillon and em-
phasizing Dillon's foreseeability language.8 5 It also cited approvingly
Archibald's statement that the shock to the plaintiff need only be "fairly
contemporaneous with the accident. '8 6 Nevertheless, the Nazaroff
court recognized that the weight of California cases had turned away
from Dillon and that a "strict" application of the "contemporaneous
observance" guideline was indicated by Justus.S7 The court also noted
that the facts in Nazaroff presented a more difficult question than
Krouse88 because the plaintiff here "was not in a position to directly
observe the initial impact of the defendant's negligence upon the re-
lated victim."89 In addition, "Itihe attempts to revive the child, and the
observation of the degenerating physical condition of the child tend to
83. 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1978).
84. Id at 559, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 659.
85. Id at 560-62, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 660-62.
86. 80 Cal. App. 3d at 564, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 663 (citing Archibald v. Braverman, 275
Cal. App. 2d 253, 256, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723, 725 (1969)).
87. 80 Cal. App. 3d at 565, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
88. See text accompanying notes 44-51 supra.
89. 80 Cal. App. 3d at 565, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
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fall within the subsequent sensory perceptions found to be too remote
in the Jansen and Arauz cases." 90 Despite these obstacles, the Nazaroff
court held that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action. It character-
ized the issue as whether shock had resulted from "contemporaneous
observation of the immediate consequences of the defendants' negli-
gent act," and held that triable issues of fact were present.91
The Nazaroff court's expansive treatment of the contemporaneous
observance guideline conforms to the approach suggested by Dillon,
but conflicts with the restrictive posture of Justus. One could have a
"contemporaneous observation" of "immediate consequences" even if
one arrived on the scene after an accident. Indeed, the Justus fathers
had a contemporaneous observance of the immediate consequences of
the attempted deliveries. In response to this tension, the Nazaroff opin-
ion carefully suggested two interpretations of its facts that would place
them as much as possible within the more restrictive case law. First,
the court emphasized the plaintiff's declaration that she had "dreadful
knowledge" that her son was in the pool when she heard a shout identi-
fying her son as the one in danger.92 This shout "may have permitted
her to reconstruct the scene. . . . [Thus] her knowledge of what had
occurred was derived from her own senses and not from another's reci-
tal of an uncontemporaneous event."'93 In addition, the court observed:
"Drowning, or near drowning, though initiated by an immersion, is not
an instantaneous occurrence. We cannot say as a matter of law that the
injuries resulting from defendants' negligence were not still being ex-
perienced at the time the mother first observed her son."'94
The second post-Justus case, Hathaway v. Superior Cour, 95 de-
cided after Nazaroff, demonstrates that the Nazaroff attempt to follow
the direction charted by Dillon is the exception rather than the rule in
California tort law. The restrictive posture of the Hathaway court also
demonstrates that the distinctions drawn today by California courts are
as arbitrary as those drawn in zone-of-danger jurisdictions. In
Hathaway, the plaintiff parents had emerged from a house minutes af-
ter their six-year old boy had touched an electrically charged cooler.96
90. Id (referring to Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal. App. 3d 937, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1977),
dicussedin text accompanying notes 54-56 supra; Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Med. Center,
31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1973)).
91. 80 Cal. App. 3d at 566, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
92. Id. at 559, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 659.
93. Id at 566, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
94. Id at 566-67, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
95. 112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1980).
96. See notes 11-14 & accompanying text supra.
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The similarity to the Nazaroff facts might suggest that triable issues of
fact also were present in Hathaway. The court of appeal in Hathaway,
however, held to the contrary, adopting the restrictive posture of Justus.
It cited Dillon for the recognition that "potentially infinite liability"
could occur as a result of its decision.97 Dillon was viewed as setting
three requirements for recovery "in an effort to restrict that possibil-
ity." 98 Noting Justus as a prominent example, the court concluded that
"most of the appellate courts have applied rather strictly the require-
ment that the injury-producing event itself be observed. ... A steady
flow of Court of Appeal cases have continued to strictly apply a con-
temporaneous sensory perception requirement of Dillon .""
The Hathaway opinion illustrates the arbitrary distinctions re-
quired of courts using the Dillon guidelines as restrictive duty limita-
tions. For example, Hathaway emphasized that, in Nazaroff, "the
mother visually perceived the boy being pulled from the pool while
alive," establishing that "the accident (drowning) was still in progress
and was observed."' 00 The Hathaway facts were distinguished in that
the victim "was no longer gripping the water cooler and receiving the
electrical charge"; 01 thus, the "event which constituted the accident
had ended."' 0 2 The contemporaneous observance requirement was not
97. 112 Cal. App. 3d at 732, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 437 (citing Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at
740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80).
98. 112 Cal. App. 3d at 732, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
99. Id at 732, 734, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 438. An example of a case strictly applying the
"requirement" is Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 506, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978).
The plaintiffs in Parsons were driving their automobile, closely following defendants' car,
which carried plaintiffs' two daughters. The court relied upon these facts: "Upon rounding
a curve, plaintiffs came upon the wreckage of the [automobile in which their daughters were
riding] knowing instantly that their close family members were within and either dead or
dying. The father left his car and reached the wreckage wherein lay his daughter before the
dust had settled. . . . It was admitted that [plaintiffs] neither saw nor heard the accident
take place." Id. at 509, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 496. The court held that the Dillon "requirement"
of a direct emotional impact upon the plaintiffs from sensory contemporaneous observation
of the accident had not been met because the plaintiffs "did not hear, see or otherwise sen-
sorily perceive the injury producing event." Id at 512, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 498. The automo-
bile carrying the plaintiffs' daughters had already come to rest against the pole before the
plaintiffs rounded the curve in their automobile and observed the wreckage." Id
100. 112 Cal. App. 3d728,736, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435,440 (1980). The Hathaway court also
emphasized that the mother in Nazaroff, upon hearing the shout identifying her son, had
immediately sensed that her son had fallen in the pool. Thus, she had an "auditory percep-
tion" of the accident at the time it was occurring. 112 Cal. App. 3d at 735, 169 Cal. Rptr. at
440 (quoting Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 506, 511, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495, 498
(1978)). In contrast, the parents in Hathaway had no thought of injury when they heard





met because plaintiffs "did not sensorily perceive the injury causing
event, that is, the actual contact between the electrically charged water
cooler and their son, but only the results of the. . . contact (the inju-
ries) after the accident was over."' 10 3
The distinctions drawn by Hathaway are weak, arbitrary, and
demeaning of the judicial process. The parents in Hathaway watched
their child within minutes of his contact with the electrically charged
cooler. The parents watched unsuccessful efforts to revive him.
Nazaroft's statement of the pertinent inquiry-whether shock resulted
from "contemporaneous observation of the immediate consequences of
the defendant's negligent act"040 -would seem equally applicable in
Hathaway. Significantly, just as drowning is "not an instantaneous oc-
currence,"' 105 neither, as the Hathaway court recognized, 106 is electrocu-
tion. A doctor's declaration had indicated that "electrocution causes
death because it interrupts the beating of the heart and the heart mus-
cle itself is denied a blood supply. Depending upon the severity of the
electrical shock the process can take time."'10 7 Thus, if the mother in
Nazaroff could be said to observe "injuries that were... still being
experienced,"'108 so could the parents in Hathaway. It is clear that the
judicial system should not require courts to make the inquiry de-
manded by Hathaway: was the dying child still grasping the electri-
cally charged water cooler as he lay gagging and spitting up? Post-
Justus California case law is so restrictive and repugnant in application
that persons sympathetic to Dillon and its premises might prefer the
zone-of-danger rule.
The Molien Turnabout
Although the Justus court applied the Dillon guidelines restric-
tively, thus suggesting an increased skepticism towards awards for
emotional distress, the California Supreme Court, in Maolien v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospltals,'°9 returned to an expansive posture towards
emotional distress. In Molien, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
doctor had erroneously and negligently diagnosed the plaintiff's wife as
suffering from an infectious type of syphilis. The doctor instructed
Mrs. Molien to tell her husband that she had been so diagnosed, and
103. Id
104. 80 Cal. App. 3d at 566, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
105. Id at 567, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
106. 112 Cal. App. 3d at 731, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
107. Id
108. 80 Cal. App. 3d at 566, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
109. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
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she did. Suspicions of extramarital sexual relations led to the eventual
breakup of the marriage.
Based on these circumstances, the plaintiff husband filed suit,
claiming negligent infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff had to
overcome two obstacles: establishing that the defendant owed him a
duty and overcoming prior California case law requiring those who
seek recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress to have also
suffered some physical injury.,
10
The court held that the defendant doctor owed the plaintiff hus-
band a duty to exercise due care in diagnosing the plaintiffs wife's con-
dition.1" The court first reiterated Dillon's methodological emphasis
on foreseeability: "[In Dillon we] identified foreseeability of the risk as
the critical inquiry. . . . [Here] we apply its general principle of fore-
seeability to the facts at hand, much as we have done in other cases
presenting complex questions of tort liability .... 11112 The court then
determined that the risk of harm to the plaintiff was reasonably fore-
seeable to the defendant. Foreseeability having been determined, the
conclusion of duty followed."1
3
Considering the plaintiff's lack of physical injury, the court an-
nounced that "emotional injury may be fully as severe and debilitating
as physical harm and is no less deserving of redress .... ,,114 Based on
this premise, the court held that a plaintiff who suffers no physical inju-
ries may state a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress if that emotional distress is "serious."" 5 Serious mental dis-
tress might be found "where a reasonable man, normally constituted,
would be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered
by the circumstances of the case."
116
Although analytically the Molien court returned to the foreseeabil-
ity analysis of Dillon, ignoring the restrictive implications of Justus, the
110. Id at 926-27, 616 P.2d at 819, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837 (1980); see, e.g., Capelouto v.
Kaiser Found. Hosps., 7 Cal. 3d 889, 500 P.2d 880, 103 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1972); Sloane v.
Southern Cal. Ry., 111 Cal. 668, 680, 44 P. 320, 322 (1896).
111. 27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
112. Id at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35.
113. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
114. Id at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
115. Id at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
116. Id at 928, 616 P.2d at 819-20, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837-38 (quoting Rodrigues v. State,
52 Hawaii 156, 173, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970)). Following the lead of the Hawaii Supreme
Court, the Molien court observed that plaintiffs might succeed either by proving that the
mental distress is of a "medically significant nature" or by establishing "some guarantee of
genuineness in the circumstances of the case." 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal.
Rptr. at 839; see notes 123-37 & accompanying text infra.
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court distinguished the facts in Molien from both Dillon and Jstus.l" 7
In Molien, the plaintiff was not present at the scene of the doctor's neg-
ligence and learned of the diagnosis later from his wife. Molien would
thus seem to run afoul of the Dillon guideline that the plaintiff must
contemporaneously observe the accident. The Molien court, however,
distinguished the facts in Dillon: "[I1n Dillon the plaintiff sought recov-
ery of damages she suffered as a percipient witness to the injury of a
third person. . . . Here, by contrast, the plaintiff was himself a direct
victim of the assertedly negligent act." ' s The court concluded that be-
cause the plaintiff was a direct victim rather than a percipient witness
of the negligent act, Dillon's guideline, as interpreted by Justus, was not
applicable.' 19 Thus, after Molien, the Dillon criteria are applicable
only to "percipient witnesses" to injury-the bystander scenario.
The court's analysis seems straightforward: to determine if the Dil-
lon guidelines are applicable, one need only determine whether a
plaintiff is a "direct victim," or a "percipient witness." Unfortunately,
the court's definition of "direct victim" does not provide any useful
distinctions. The court reasoned that the risk of harm to the husband
was reasonably foreseeable, and so it followed that "the alleged tortious
conduct of defendant was directed to him as well as to his wife ....
[U]nder these circumstances defendants owed plaintiff a duty to exer-
cise due care in diagnosing the condition of his wife."' 120 Foreseeability
of harm is thus offered as the only definition of a "direct victim."
This definition is obviously inadequate because it fails to exclude
percipient witnesses from its ambit. For example, in Justus, negligence
resulting in a stillbirth posed a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to
the father in the operating room. Under the reasoning of Molien, the
allegedly tortious conduct of the doctor would be directed to the father
as well as to his child. The Molien definition of "direct victim," pur-
porting to distinguish the "bystander scenario," would thus make the
father in Justus a "direct victim." Justus, however, was intended to
deny recovery to some persons who foreseeably would suffer emotional
distress.' 2' The significance of Justus lay in converting the expansive,
and expandable, Dillon guidelines into duty limitations on recovery for
117. 27 Cal. 3d at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at
817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
118. Id at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
119. Id: "By insisting that the present facts fail to satisfy the first and second of the
Dillon criteria, defendants urge a rote application of the guidelines to a case factually dis-
similar to the bystander scenario."
120. Id at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
121. See notes 63-82 & accompanying text supra.
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foreseeable harm. Molien, in contrast, allows recovery for emotional
harm caused to "direct victims," defined as persons to whom emotional
distress is foreseeable. If the Molien logic is pursued, nothing is left of
Justus.
In Justus, the court had limited recovery for foreseeable emotional
distress, but in Molien it returned to the expansive posture espoused in
Dillon. Molien expands liability for emotional distress by abrogating
the physical injury requirement in cases of serious emotional distress.
By holding that a husband is a direct victim and can recover when a
doctor misdiagnoses his wife as having syphilis, the court creates a po-
tentially enormous class of persons who in the future may be able to
recover for emotional distress. Plaintiffs can recover for emotional dis-
tress without regard to the Dillon guidelines if they are "direct victims,"
and "direct victims" appear to be persons to whom emotional distress is
foreseeable. The court asserts that Dillon-Justus plaintiffs are distin-
guishable, but its definition of "direct victim" does not exclude them.
Unlike Justus, Molien reaffirms Dillon's emphasis on foreseeability of
the risk as the crucial factor. 122
A Policy Perspective on California Case Law: False Starts
In light of the inconsistent approach of the California Supreme
Court in Dillon, Justus, and Molien, California tort law governing re-
covery for emotional distress appears chaotic. Coherence emerges
however, once one views these cases as incremental steps taken to re-
solve the difficult questions of policy raised by the emotional distress
issue. From this perspective, Dillon emerges as a first effort to expand
recovery for emotional distress. Dillon did not, however, satisfy the
need to confine this new approach to manageable dimensions. The
case law subsequent to Dillon addressed this problem.
Traditionally, courts have viewed mental suffering with suspicion,
as an affliction whose suspected causes included the moral turpitude, or
"sins," of the individual.123 Recently, however, psychic injury has
emerged as a medical condition capable of clinical evaluation. More-
over, with the development of tests and diagnostic techniques, espe-
cially in the field of psychiatry, commentators have concluded that the
existence and severity of psychic harm can be established with medical
122. 27 Cal. 3d at 922, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
123. See, e.g., Huston v. Freemansburg Borough, 212 Pa. 548, 550, 61 A. 1022, 1023
(1905); Leibson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Dtstress Caused by Physical Injury to
Another, 15 J. FAM. L. 163, 163-64 (1976-77); see also Magruder, Mental and Emotional
Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REv. 1033 (1936).
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certainty and that psychic damage can be causally linked to the shock
experienced at having witnessed injury to another. 124 Dillon reflected
this modem perspective in abandoning the zone-of-danger rule.
Yet even modem courts have seen special sources of concern in
actions for emotional distress.. The Dillon court articulated two con-
cerns: mental injury claims are conducive to fraud, and expanded re-
covery for emotional distress may lead to a multiplicity of claims and
unlimited liability. 125 Dillon, in turn, offered two devices to meet these
concerns: the requirement that the plaintiff's emotional distress result
in physical injury, and the requirement that courts, aided by "guide-
lines," determine that the risk is foreseeable. 126 Other courts have fol-
lowed this lead and have attempted to fashion similar requirements in
bystander emotional distress cases.' 27 California Supreme Court case
law subsequent to Dillon can be seen as an attempt to test and improve
these two screening devices. Each of these devices, however, is flawed;
the court's attempts to use them to confine the emotional distress action
were false starts.
The Physical Injury Requirement
Dillon viewed the physical injury requirement primarily as a safe-
guard against fraudulent claims, 28 but that requirement could also be
used to screen claims to avoid a flood of litigation and unlimited liabil-
ity. In Krouse v. Graham,129 the court appeared to attempt to
strengthen this screening device by emphasizing that plaintiffs must es-
tablish that the "precise cause" of their physical injury is the "shock
occasioned by... perception of the [accident, as opposed to] under-
standable feelings of anger and retribution, or.. .feelings of grief and
sorrow .... ,,130 Treated in this manner, the physical injury require-
124. See, ag., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 613, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 556, 249
N.E.2d 419 (1969) ("mental traumatic causation can now be diagnosed almost as well as
physical causation"). See also Recent Development, Torts--Mental Distress, 63 GEo. L.J.
1179, 1184-85 (1975).
125. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
126. Id at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
127. See, eg., D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 31 Conn. Supp. 164, 32 A.2d 129
(1973); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 728 (1974); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375
Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978); Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140
(1973); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404
A.2d 672 (1979); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.L 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975); Landreth v.
Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214
(1973); Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976).
128. 68 Cal. 2d at 738 n.4, 441 P.2d at 918 n.4, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78-79 n.4.
129. 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977).
130. Id at 77, 562 P.2d at 1031, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 872. In Xrouse itself, the court con-
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ment could have become a potent liability-limiting device. By 1980,
however, the court had abandoned the hope that the physical injury
requirement could serve this function. In Molien, the court rejected
Dillon's physical injury rule and held that a plaintiff who is the direct
victim of the defendant's negligence may state a cause of action solely
for negligent inffiction of emotional distress, absent physical injury,'
3 '
if the plaintiffs emotional distress is "serious."' 32 Although the hold-
ing in Molien was applied to direct victims, and therefore is not prece-
dent for bystanders,' 33 the Molien court's analysis also applies to
bystander cases 134 and demolishes any hope that the physical injury
requirement can protect against fraudulent claims or unlimited
liability.
As to fraud, the court pointed out that the physical injury limita-
tion is both overinclusive and underinclusive.' 35 The court also im-
plied that the physical injury requirement may be met merely by
extravagant pleading and distorted testimony, thus further undermin-
ing its practical utility as a screening device for fraud.136 These obser-
vations also undermine the utility of the physical injury requirement as
a liability-limiting device.
137
Foreseeability and the Guidelines
Dillon's second screening device, the foreseeability criterion aug-
cluded that the expert medical testimony was in conflict with respect to the "precise cause"
of the plaintiff's gastric disturbance. Id Furthermore, the jury instruction was flawed be-
cause it did not adequately specify that the plaintiff's physical injury must be a result of his
shock occasioned by his perception of the accident. Id at 77, 562 P.2d at 1031-32, 137 Cal.
Rptr. at 872-73. The court noted that it was reasonable to assume in this case that the award
represented compensation for "such improper elements as grief, sorrow, anger and retribu-
tion." Id at 77-78, 562 P.2d at 1032, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 873. It thus reversed the plaintiffs
verdict.
131. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 930, 616 P.2d 813, 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 839 (1980).
132. Id
133. Id at 923, 616 P.2d at 834, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
134. The Molien court reasoned that contemporary knowledge demonstrates that "emo-
tional injury may be fully as severe and debilitating as physical harm, and is no less deserv-
ing of redress. ... Id at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832. In addition, the
court concluded that an attempted distinction between physical and psychological injury is
"artificial," "arbitrary," and merely "clouds the issue." Id at 929-30, 616 P.2d at 821, 167
Cal. Rptr. at 839.
135. Id at 928-29, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838. The classification is overinclu-
sive because it permits recovery even where the physical injury is trivial. Id at 928, 616 P.2d
at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838. The physical injury requirement is underinclusive because it
"mechanically denies court access to claims that may be valid and could be proved if the
plaintiffs were permitted to go to trial." Id at 929, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
136. See id at 929, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
137. Id at 928, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
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mented by the guidelines, was offered as a means of protecting against
unlimited liability. 138 The use of this device, however, has led to results
as arbitrary, and at times as restrictive, as in zone-of-danger jurisdic-
tions. The reason for the failure of this device is apparent if one exam-
ines carefully the posture of the California Supreme Court in Dillon.
The Dillon court was unconcerned with the problem of screening
claims to avoid a "'flood of litigation.' 139 The guidelines were
promulgated in the context of expanding recovery for emotional dis-
tress and were presented as factors to aid courts in determining foresee-
ability of this harm. They were not intended to be rigid prerequisites to
recovery. 140 When Justus was decided, however, the court was no
longer indifferent to the specter of unlimited liability. The unarticu-
lated premise of the court's restrictive holding in Justus was a renewed
concern over multiple claims and unlimited liability. This premise was
evident in other decisions of this period, notably a pair of decisions
refusing to sanction a cause of action for loss of parent-child consor-
tium. The consortium decisions, Borer v. American Airlines14 1 and Bax-
ter v. Superior Court,142 illuminate the court's decision that same year
in Justus. Borer and Baxter were decided soon after the liability-ex-
panding case of Rodrigues v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. 143 In Rodrigues,
the court overruled precedent and sanctioned a cause of action for loss
of consortium by a spouse. As in Dillon, Rodrigues rejected the argu-
ment that its holding would lead to unlimited liability, and emphasized
the element of foreseeability: "One who negligently causes a severely
disabling injury to an adult may reasonably expect that the injured per-
son is married and that his or her spouse will be severely affected by
that injury.'" 144 The holdings and reasoning of Borer and Baxter are in
sharp contrast to Rodrigues. In Borer, the court wrote that "foreseeable
injury to a legally recognized relationship [does not] necessarily [postu-
late] a cause of action .... -145 The court was concerned with multi-
ple actions and unlimited liability, in the context of which it wrote:
138. 68 Cal. 2d at 739-42, 441 P.2d at 919-22, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79-82.
139. Id at 735 n.3, 441 P.2d at 917 n.3, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77 n.3.
140. Thus, the court in Dillon emphasized that "the chief element in determining
whether defendant owes a duty... to plaintiff is the foreseeability of the risk." id at 740,
441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The guidelines were merely "factors" to be taken into
account "[i]n determining ... whether defendant should reasonably foresee the injury to
plaintiff." Id
141. 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977).
142. 19 Cal. 3d 461, 563 P.2d 871, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977).
143. 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974).
144. Id at 400, 525 P.2d at 680, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
145. 19 Cal. 3d at 446, 563 P.2d at 861, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
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"We cannot ignore the social burden of providing damages for loss of
parental consortium merely because the money to pay such awards
comes initially from the 'negligent' defendant or his insurer. . . .Re-
alistically the burden of payment of awards for loss of consortium must
be borne by the public generally. . . ." 146 To avoid unlimited liabil-
ity, the court concluded that the law must intervene to delimit
liability.
147
Just as the consortium decisions refused to follow the clear impli-
cations of the foreseeability principle because of the court's express
concern over unlimited liability, Justus responded to this concern by
"refining" the Dillon guidelines as a screening device for emotional dis-
tress claims. Because the guidelines were not designed for this purpose,
however, the consequence has been a set of rigid duty rules leading to
arbitrary and unseemly results. 48 The holding and underlying ration-
ale of Justus return California to a posture resembling jurisdictions that
follow the zone-of-danger rule.
The Justus court's holding resembles the response by the New
York Court of Appeals to the question of unlimited liability in Tobin v.
Grossman.149 Unlike the Dillon court, the Tobin court was troubled by
the possibility of "unlimited liability." Writing for the court in Tobin,
Judge Breitel retained the zone-of-danger rule. Rather than stating
that it was unforeseeable that persons outside the zone of danger would
suffer emotional distress, however, the court rejected the theory that in
emotional distress cases foreseeability should lead to liability. The
court was concerned with unlimited liability: "[Floreseeability, once
recognized, is not so easily limited ..... [T]he logic of the [foresee-
ability] principle would not and could not remain confined."' 50 As a
matter of policy, therefore, the extensive liability implied by the fore-
seeability principle was viewed as undesirable because it would create
an "unduly burdensome liability."'
5'
The Tobin court reviewed the Dillon guidelines from this perspec-
tive, concluding that foreseeable harm might occur even if one, or all,
146. Id at 447, 563 P.2d at 862, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
147. Id at 446, 563 P.2d at 861, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
148. See notes 83-108 & accompanying text supra.
149. 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
150. Id
151. Id at 615, 617, 249 N.E.2d at 442, 443, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558, 559. The court also
noted that the burden of this liability would not be relieved by insurance. "[Clonstantly
advancing insurance costs can become an undue burden as well, and the aggregate recov-
eries in a single accident of this kind are not likely to stay within ordinary, let alone, compul-
sory insurance liability limits." Id at 617, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559-60.
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of the Dillon guidelines were absent. For example, nonrelatives could
foreseeably suffer emotional distress.152 Similarly, "[a]ny rule based
solely on eyewitnessing the accident could stand only until the first case
comes along in which the parent is in the immediate vicinity but did
not see the accident."'' 53 Furthermore, even if one is not in the immedi-
ate vicinity but learns of the harm by telephone, harm may still be fore-
seeable: "The sight of gore and exposed bones is not necessary to
provide special impact on a parent."' 54 The Tobin court concluded
that any attempt to limit liability will consist of "arbitrary distinc-
tions."155 Of the various arbitrary alternatives, it chose to rely on the
zone-of-danger rule. Dillon, of course, rejected the zone-of-danger rule
precisely because of its arbitrariness. Ironically, Justus adopted an
equally arbitrary approach, premised on the very policy considerations
that underlie Tobin's rejection of Dillon.
A Proposed Solution
Because of the failure of Dillon's two screening devices and the
California Supreme Court's apparent concern, exemplified by Justus,
with containing the emotional distress cause of action, it must be deter-
mined whether California case law suggests a less arbitrary solution
than either Justus-style duty limitations or the zone-of-danger rule.
Molien's approach to "direct victim" emotional distress cases can and
should be adapted to the "bystander scenario." The Molien court used
foreseeability as the criterion for determining whether a plaintiff is a
"direct victim," and held that physical injuries need not be established
if such a plaintiff suffers emotional distress that is "serious." This ap-
proach should be applied to Dillon "bystander" cases. Thus, a person
who suffers emotional distress because he or she fears for the safety of
another would be able to recover damages if: (1) emotional distress
was foreseeable to that person; and (2) the emotional distress actually
suffered was serious. Under this proposal, the Dillon factors would
function as intended by the Dillon court: as guidelines to assist in de-
termining foreseeability. Based on these guidelines and other consider-
ations, courts could rule that, as a matter of law, harm to the plaintiff
152. Id at 616, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
153. Id at 617, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 560. See notes 39-42 & accompany-
ing text supra.
154. 24 N.Y.2d at 617, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
155. Id at 618, 249 N.E.2d at 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 561. There "appears to be no ra-
tional way to limit the scope of liability." Id (paraphrasing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
Ta LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 353-54 (3d ed. 1964)).
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was not foreseeable. Mere failure of a plaintiff to meet one or more
Dillon guidelines, however, would not by itself necessitate such a
conclusion.
The Molien opinion does not discuss the implications of its deci-
sion for bystander cases. The court's analysis, however, clearly sup-
ports a conclusion that bystander cases should be resolved by the
principles of foreseeability and seriousness. The court's critique of the
physical injury requirement and its assertion of the superiority of the
seriousness criterion 56 is equally applicable in bystander cases. With
respect to the Dillon guidelines, the Molien court properly observed
that they are relevant to the "bystander scenario," but not necessarily
to direct victims such as the Molien husband whose wife was misdiag-
nosed. 157 Moreover, the discussion in Molien of these guidelines sug-
gests that in bystander cases the court will return to its Dillon posture
and use the guidelines as guidelines rather than as inflexible duty limi-
tations on liability for foreseeable harm. Thus, the court characterized
the guidelines as "factors bearing on the determination whether the de-
fendant should reasonably have foreseen injury to the plaintiff
... ,158 The criterion of reasonable foreseeability "contemplates that
courts, on a case-to-case basis, analyzing all the circumstances, will de-
cide what the ordinary man under such circumstances should reason-
ably have foreseen." 159
Use of the twin requirements of foreseeability and seriousness
should enable the court to protect against fraud, multiple claims, and
unlimited liability without encountering the problems associated with
its attempts to adapt Dillon's physical injury requirement and guide-
lines to this purpose. Molien convincingly demonstrates the superiority
of seriousness, in comparison with the requirement of physical injury,
as a safeguard against fraudulent claims in emotional distress cases.160
Moreover, a seriousness requirement avoids the possibility of a multi-
tude of trivial claims that would burden defendants, insurers, and the
court system.
The dual requirements of seriousness and foreseeability are well
suited to protecting against unlimited liability. Foreseeability has long
been accepted as an adequate screening device in cases in which physi-
156. See notes 128-37 & accompanying text supra; see notes 160-205 & accompanying
text infra.
157. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 923, 616 P.2d 813, 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 834 (1980).
158. Id at 922, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
159. Id




cal injury is immediately caused by the defendant's conduct.' 6 1 In
emotional distress cases, in contrast, courts have assumed that addi-
tional protection is necessary. Explicit statements to this effect, such as
that of the Tobin 162 court, have failed to offer convincing evidence. As
the specter of unlimited liability has repeatedly been raised by oppo-
nents of tort reform,163 it is unclear that it should be given great weight
in the present context. 164 Assuming, however, that additional protec-
tion is needed in emotional distress cases and that liability is to be de-
nied in some cases in which emotional distress is foreseeable,
seriousness provides the proper criterion. Serious emotional distress
may require extensive medical treatment and hospitalization, and may
interrupt normal work and household duties. This type of loss is asso-
ciated with cases of physical harm immediately caused by a defendant's
conduct. There is no reason to deny recovery for this type of loss. It is
as absurd to anticipate a "flood" of these claims and thus "unlimited
liability" as it is to suppose that serious problems of fraud would arise.
A rational screening device should select for compensation those cases
that are most deserving. In this regard, the seriousness criterion is far
superior to the arbitrary duty rules exemplified by either Justus or
Tobin. Among instances of foreseeable emotional distress, it is defensi-
ble to conclude that, with respect to compensation, serious injury
should take precedence over trivial injury. In contrast, it seems arbi-
trary to deny compensation to a plaintiff whose emotional distress is
both foreseeable and serious merely because he or she fails to meet one
of the Dillon guidelines. Finally, through the doctrines of foreseeabil-
ity and seriousness, courts can regulate the number of cases in which
liability is assessed, thus negating the prospect of unlimited liability.
Two cases illustrate this approach. First, in Archibald v.
161. See, e.g., Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr.
468 (1975). Of course, foreseeability is used in conjunction with doctrines such as proximate
cause.
162. Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969); see
notes 149-155 & accompanying text supra.
163. See, ag., Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
164. Practical considerations are often ignored in discussions of tort actions for emo-
tional distress. The judiciary does not fear trivial actions for physical harm, implicitly rec-
ognizing practical realities of the litigation process that act as efficient screening devices.
First, attorneys only take cases in which the likelihood of liability and the potential size of
the damage award justify their expenditure of time. Second, and in part as a consequence of
this fact, the vast majority of persons suffering minor injury in an accident do not attempt to
institute litigation. Attorneys who litigate emotional distress cases report that juries are
quite skeptical regarding this type of recovery. Thus, these practical constraints should op-
erate even more effectively in cases where the minor injury is emotional.
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Braverman, 65 a mother came upon the scene after an explosion had
injured her son. The plaintiff-mother's experience is suggested by the
court's account of the son's injuries, which included "traumatic ampu-
tation of the right hand, the right wrist, and a portion of his right fore-
arm, traumatic amputation of a portion of his left hand, severe
lacerations of his body, a grave injury of the right eye, and loss of copi-
ous amounts of blood .... 166 Upon observing these injuries, the
plaintiff mother "suffered severe fright, shock, and mental illness requir-
ing institutionalization."'' 67 Second, in Portee v. Jaffee, 68 a 1980 New
Jersey case, the plaintiff was the mother of a seven-year old boy who
"became trapped in [their apartment] building's elevator between its
outer door and the wall of the elevator shaft. The elevator was acti-
vated and the boy was dragged up to the third floor."'169 The plaintiff
arrived at the scene of the accident after these initial events, but
watched as police worked for hours to free her child as he "moaned,
cried out and flailed his arms. Much of the time she was restrained
from touching him, apparently to prevent interference with the at-
tempted rescue. The child suffered multiple bone fractures and mas-
sive internal hemorrhaging. He died while still trapped, his mother a
helpless observer."170 The consequence to the mother was that she "be-
came severely depressed and seriously self-destructive. . . . [S]he at-
tempted to take her own life . . . with a laceration of her left wrist
more than two inches deep. She survived . . . but she has since re-
quired considerable physical therapy and presently has no sensation in
a portion of her left hand. She has received extensive counseling and
psychotherapy to help overcome the mental and emotional problems
caused by her son's death."'
71
In both Archibald and Portee, emotional distress was foreseeable
to the plaintiff mothers; under any conceivable definition, the emo-
tional distress actually suffered was serious. That these plaintiffs
should receive compensationfrom negligent defendants seems compel-
ling. One would not anticipate unlimited liability because of a flood of
cases of this type. Nor should there be serious concern that such cases
are fraudulent. Yet each of these cases arguably fails to meet Justus's
165. 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969). See notes 48-51 & accompanying
text supra.
166. Id at 255, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
167. Id (emphasis added).
168. 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980).
169. Id at 91, 417 A.2d at 522.
170. Id at 91, 417 A.2d at 522-23.
171. Id at 91-92, 417 A.2d at 523.
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liability-limiting duty rules. The Archibald court allowed recovery, 172
but the Hathaway decision suggests that most courts would deny recov-
ery because the plaintiff did not observe the injury-producing event. 173
Similarly, it is not clear that the mother in Portee would satisfy the
Justus criteria.174 She did not see, hear, or otherwise sensorily perceive
the injury-producing event, nor did she perceive the initial receipt of
the injuries by her son. The elevator had come to rest on the third floor
before she arrived. Furthermore, it is uncertain that she understood the
nature of the injuries being suffered by her son while they were actually
being suffered. The massive internal hemorrhaging that led to his
death was arguably as hidden as were the developments that led to the
intrauterine death of the fetus in Justus. Portee andArchibald illustrate
the conclusion that, if lines must be drawn, lines based on foreseeability
and seriousness are preferable to the arbitrary duty limitations of either
Tobin or Justus.
In retrospect, it appears likely that the Dillon court envisioned a
seriousness criterion and that its physical injury requirement was a pre-
liminary articulation of such a standard. The proposal set forth here is
thus a refinement, rather than a repudiation, of Dillon's physical injury
requirement. Support for this contention is found in the court's 1977
decision, Borer v. American Airlines,175 which refused to allow recovery
for loss of parent-child consortium. Although the Borer court's articu-
lated concern over unlimited liability is suggestive of Justus's restrictive
posture that same year,176 the court in Borer distinguished emotional
distress actions from actions for loss of consortium. The court empha-
sized that Dillon and subsequent decisions required physical injury to
the plaintiff,177 and thus concluded that "Dillon and subsequent au-
thority support our [consortium] decision .... ,"178 In light of the fact
that Molien only three years later discredited the physical injury re-
quirement, identifying it with nineteenth century courts that lacked the
insights provided by modern medical science, 179 the attempted distinc-
tion in Borer might seem both weak and peculiar. On closer examina-
tion, however, it is neither.
Justice Tobriner, the author of both Dillon and Borer, wrote in
172. See notes 48-51 & accompanying text supra.
173. See notes 95-108 & accompanying text supra.
174. See notes 53-82 & accompanying text supra.
175. 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977).
176. See notes 53-82 & accompanying text upra.
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Borer that the distinguishing factor between Dillon emotional distress
actions and consortium actions is that the former involve physical in-
jury, whereas the latter is "a cause of action founded upon purely in-
tangible injury."1 80 Borer thus suggests that Dillon's physical injury
requirement was intended to select for compensation emotional distress
claims that entailed an element of real, tangible loss. To the Borer
court, claims for purely intangible injury are less deserving of compen-
sation than claims for tangible loss because money can never compen-
sate for intangible loss.
[M]onetary compensation will not enable plaintiffs to regain the
companionship and guidance of a mother; it will simply establish a
fund so that upon reaching adulthood, when plaintiffs will be less in
need of maternal guidance, they will be unusually wealthy men and
women. To say that plaintiffs have been "compensated" for their
loss is superficial; in reality they have suffered a loss for which they
can never be compensated; they have obtained, instead, a future ben-
efit essentially unrelated to that loss.' 8 '
Consistent with Dillon and Borer, the proposal set forth here rec-
ognizes that tangible loss is more deserving of compensation than in-
tangible loss. Molien suggests, however, that the seriousness criterion is
superior to the physical injury requirement as a guide to emotional dis-
tress actions that will, in fact, involve tangible loss. Minor emotional
distress, accompanied by slight physical injury, may not entail tangible
loss. Conversely, serious emotional distress may entail real tangible
loss, even in the absence of physical injury. As illustrated by Archibald
and Portee, serious emotional distress may require extensive medical
treatment, including in some instances hospitalization, and may disrupt
one's ability to perform normal work and household duties. This type
of harm is, of course, precisely the type associated with tort actions
based not on emotional distress but rather on physical injury immedi-
ately caused by a defendant's conduct. The seriousness criterion would
sanction recovery in emotional distress cases in which this type of harm
occurs.
Moreover, formal adaptation of Molien's seriousness criterion to
bystander cases would conform legal doctrine to judicial practice.
Even when, as is often the case, seriousness has not been explicitly rec-
ognized as a controlling doctrinal element in bystander cases, the re-
sults of these cases have tended to correlate with the seriousness of
harm suffered by the bystander. For example, in the overwhelming
majority of California appellate decisions upholding recovery, emo-
180. Id
181. Id at 447, 563 P.2d at 862, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
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tional distress has been so serious as to require psychiatric treatment. 1
82
Conversely, in the overwhelming majority of cases where courts denied
recovery, psychiatric care has not been required.
8 3
This discussion suggests that a definition of seriousness should, in
conjunction with the foreseeability criterion, avoid the prospect of un-
limited liability, as well as protect against fraud and trivial claims, by
identifying those cases of emotional distress most worthy of compensa-
tion. An examination of judicial opinions 8 4 reveals that courts in re-
cent years have attempted to formulate such a definition. 8 5 Molien
provides the appropriate touchstone with its admonition "that emo-
tional injury. . . as severe and debilitating as physical harm . . . is
. . . deserving of redress."' 8 6 The seriousness criterion thus refers to
severe and debilitating emotional injury with its attendant painful
mental suffering and anguish-injury of grave intensity and duration,
as opposed to injury of a trivial and transient nature. 8 7
182. Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977) (re-
quired psychological therapy to treat severely depressed state of mind); Nazaroffv. Superior
Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1978) (under the care of a psychiatrist and
taking medication for shock and depression); Mobaldi v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 55 Cal.
App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976) (treated by a psychiatrist and prognosis for recovery
only fair); Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969) (suffered
severe fright, shock, and mental illness requiring institutionalization).
183. Hathaway v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1980); Cor-
tez v. Macias, 110 Cal. App. 3d 640, 167 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1980); Drew v. Drake, 110 Cal. App.
3d 555, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1980); Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 506, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 495 (1978); Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639
(1975); Powers v. Sissoev, 39 Cal. App. 3d 865, 114 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1974); Jansen v. Chil-
dren's Hosp. Med. Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1973); Deboe v. Horn, 16
Cal. App. 3d 221, 94 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1971).
184. The insights of medical science are important in the determination of what consti-
tutes a compensable emotional injury. Nevertheless, this determination is ultimately a legal
question involving such pragmatic considerations as the need to limit liability and the ease
of application by judges and juries. See note 187 infra.
185. See, eg., Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Rodrigues v.
State, 52 Hawaii 156,472 P.2d 509 (1970) (adopting a standard allowing recovery for serious
mental distress based upon the reaction of "the reasonable man"); Barnhill v. Davis, 300
N.W.2d 104 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1981) (emotional distress to bystander must be serious to be
compensable; ordinarily must be accompanied with physical manifestations of the distress);
Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, - Mass. -, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980); Dziokonski v.
Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978) (recovery for parents who sustained sub-
stantial physical harm as a result of severe mental distress); Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417
A.2d 521 (1980) (resulting severe emotional distress as a required element for recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979)
(followed Leong standard of recovery for serious mental distress; no requirement of physical
injury).
186. 27 Cal. 3d at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
187. See Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 413, 520 P.2d 758, 767 (1974).
A marked similarity exists between severe emotional distress experienced by bystanders
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Molien also suggests that a means of determining whether emo-
tional distress is severe and debilitating is to inquire whether "a reason-
able man, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope
with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case." 18
8
and at least two medically recognized disorders: the post-traumatic stress disorder ("PSD")
and abnormal or morbid grief. Molien indicates that one of the emotional injuries to be
considered serious is "traumatic neurosis." 27 Cal. 3d at 933, 616 P.2d at 823, 167 Cal. Rptr.
at 841. PSD "draws on the earlier concept of. . . traumatic neurosis." COMPREHENSIVE
TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY III 1517 A. Kaplan, M. Freedman, G. Sadock (3rd ed. 1980)
(Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, 21.ld, at 1517) [hereinafter cited as TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIA-
TRY].
The American Psychiatric Association's third edition of Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) recently defined PSD. Critical to the development of this
condition is the experiencing of a "stressor [which] must be severe enough to be outside the
range of human experience usually considered to be normal. . . . These stressors would all
be classified as either extreme . . . or catastrophic." Id. at 1519-21. This disorder often
follows the experiencing of a traumatic injury to a loved one. Id. at 1518.
Among the reactions of one suffering from PSD is "some form of diminished or con-
stricted responsiveness .... " Id. at 1521. In its more severe form "the patient may com-
plain of an inability to feel emotions of any type, especially those associated with intimacy,
tenderness, and sexuality." Id. "Psychic numbing may diminish or destroy interpersonal
relationships, such as marriage and family life." Id. at 1523. PSD may lead to complica-
tions including the "phobic avoidance of situations or activities resembling or symbolizing
the original trauma" and may "handicap the patient occupationally or recreationally." Id.
Other complications include "the use of central nervous system depressants, such as barbitu-
ates, tranquilizers and alcohol. . . which may lead to a chemical or psychological depen-
dency on such drugs. The emotional liability, depressive symptoms, and guilt feelings may
result in self-defeating behavior, suicide attempts, or completed suicide." Id.
Just as judicial recognition of emotional distress has been slow in developing, so too has
official medical recognition of PSD as a separate and distinct disorder capable of diagnosis
and treatment been "late in arriving and long overdue." TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra,
at 1517. This medical recognition should provide welcome assurance to courts reviewing
cases involving injuries of this sort.
Damages for normal grief are not recoverable in bystander emotional distress actions.
See Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 72, 562 P.2d 1022, 1028, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863, 869
(1977). Abnormal or morbid grief, however, is a medically recognized emotional disorder
which has been described as an exaggeration of the symptoms of normal grief, in terms of
duration and intensity, prolonged denial of loss, anxiety, depression, and self-destructive
urges. See TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra, at 690; see also Lindemann, Symptomatology
and Management ofAcute Grief, 101 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 141 (1944). Abnormal grief often is
triggered when a person has no time to marshall his or her emotional reserves to deal with
the anguish of final separation by death. Thus it may arise because one is a bystander of a
negligently caused accident which kills a loved one. When such is the case, abnormal grief
would properly be viewed as an element of recoverable emotional distress.
188. 27 Cal. 3d at 928, 616 P.2d at 819-20, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837-38 (citing Rodrigues v.
State, 52 Hawaii 156, 173, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970)).
This language might be seen to suggest that a plaintiff's action should be barred unless a
"normally constituted person" would suffer emotional distress of a magnitude similar to that
suffered by the plaintiff. This result would be inconsistent with the traditional "thin skull
plaintiff," under which a defendant takes his victim as he finds him. See Steinhauser v.
Hertz Corp. 421 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1970). Retention of the "thin skull plaintiff" rule would
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Severe and debilitating emotional injury, for example, may be
asssociated with an inability to return to a normal routine, 89 including
an inability to perform usual work, household, or childrearing duties
adequately. 90 Another common manifestation of serious emotional
distress is a disruption in the person's relationships with friends, associ-
ates, and loved ones, including interference with the nurturing aspects
of childrearing. 191 One who suffers from serious emotional distress
might be characterized as unproductive, distracted, aimless, and prone
to fits of temper or emotional outbursts. 192 Among the emotional inju-
ries that should be considered serious are "traumatically induced neu-
rosis, psychosis, chronic depression or phobia."'193 Debilitating
emotional injuries may result in somatic manifestations, such as lack of
strength, muscle tension, physical exhaustion and the more extreme
consequences of heart attacks, miscarriages, and strokes.' 94 Psychic
seem more consistent with the approach of the Molien court and the quoted Molien lan-
guage. Thus recovery would be allowed so long as the mental stress actually suffered is of
sufficient magnitude to cause a normally constituted person to be unable adequately to cope.
The concerns of courts wary of retaining a thin skull plaintiff rule in emotional distress
cases, see Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976), should be met by requir-
ing that some emotional distress to the plaintiff be foreseeable and that the emotional dis-
tress in fact suffered be serious.
189. Leibson, Recovery of Damagesfor Emotional Distress Caused By Physical Infury to
,4nother, 15 J. FAM. L. 163, 205 (1976-77).
190. See, eg., Mobaldi v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr.
720 (1976) (plaintiff suffered from despair and futility to the extent that she sometimes be-
came bedridden); Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969)
(plaintiff had mental illness requiring institutionalization).
A person who usually works in the home might be found unable to carry out the normal
household functions. See, e.g., Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970) (in-
ability to perform ordinary household duties); Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207
N.W.2d 140 (1973) (plaintiff alleged inability to function as she had previously, for a period
of nine months following the accident).
191. See, eg., D'Ambra v. United States, 396 F. Supp. 1180 (D. R.I. 1973) (mother had
trouble holding recently born twins who reminded her of her dead son); Toms v. McCon-
nell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973) (plaintiff withdrew from normal forms of
socialization).
192. See, e.g., Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970) (extreme nervous-
ness and irritability); Covington v. Estate of Foster, 584 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)
(general nervousness, worry, and inability to concentrate); Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d
486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (distractibility, extreme nervousness).
193. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d at 933, 616 P.2d at 823, 167 Cal. Rptr.
at 841.
194. See, ag., Mobaldi v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr.
720 (1976) (plaintiff experienced forty-pound weight loss, suffered from insomnia); Barnhill
v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1981) (plaintiff suffered from dizziness and diffi-
culty in sleeping, pain in the back and legs); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380
N.E.2d 1295 (1978) (plaintiff, father, suffered a coronary occlusion); Daley v. LaCroix, 384
Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970) (plaintiff experienced sudden loss of weight); Landreth v.
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manifestations of serious emotional distress might include severe de-
pression, suicidal tendencies, nightmares, and neurotic fears of some-
thing connected with the victim's injuries. 195
This listing of common reactions to and manifestations of severe
and debilitating emotional injury is not intended to be exhaustive;
rather, it is illustrative of those types of disorders often associated with
serious emotional distress. These characteristics, as well as the severe
and debilitating standard, are drawn largely from our analysis of judi-
cial efforts to compensate deserving victims, often, as in Archibald, in
the face of precedents weighing heavily against recovery.196 The con-
cept of severe and debilitating emotional injury proposed here is an
exposition of the commonality among such cases. Leading jurisdic-
tions in emotional distress cases have begun to articulate standards for
recovery embodying this concept, and these courts also have identified
characteristics similar to those listed here to determine the existence of
emotional injury sufficiently serious to warrant compensation.
197
With respect to questions of proof, Molien again offers sound gui-
dance. Proof that the emotional distress caused by fear for the safety of
another is severe and debilitating may, but need not, be accomplished
by the introduction of expert medical testimony.1 98 Expert medical tes-
timony could establish, for example, that the plaintiff suffers from a
Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (plaintiff experienced loss of weight and diffi-
culty in sleeping); Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976) (plaintiff suf-
fered heart stress).
195. See, e.g., D'Ambra v. United States, 396 F. Supp. 1180 (D. R.I. 1973) (plaintiff had
nightmares of the accident and of her son covered in blood; re-experienced sensation of
warm blood running down her body, as when she picked up her son at the scene of the
accident); Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022 (1977) (severely depressed state
of mind); Nazaroff v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1978) (re-
quired medication for shock and depression; drank heavily and wanted to commit suicide);
Mobaldi v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal.Rptr. 720 (1976) (severely
depressed); Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973) (severe trau-
matic depressive reaction); Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980) (severely de-
pressed and seriously self-destructive; attempted to take her own life by laceration of the
wrist); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979) (grievous mental pain and suffering
resulting in severe depression and acute nervous condition).
196. The courts have sometimes characterized these elements of damage as the physical
manifestations necessary to support a claim. Separating purely psychological manifestations
of severe emotional distress from its somatic presentation is difficult at best. "It is now
clearly recognized by medical experts that mental injury and physical injury are not separate
and distinct types of harm. All emotional disturbances necessarily possess some physical
aspect." Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distres.s: The Casefor an Inde endent Tort,
59 GEo. L.J. 1237, 1259 n.128 (1971).
197. See note 185 & accompanying text supra.
198. 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
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recognizable psychiatric illness of a debilitating nature.199 Even if a
plaintiff does not introduce expert medical testimony, however, he or
she may establish the seriousness of emotional distress through the cir-
cumstances of the case. The Molien court spoke of "some guarantee of
genuineness in the circumstances of the case," 200 and suggested that
objectively verifiable facts could enable a factfinder to conclude that
the defendant's actions caused genuine and serious emotional dis-
tress.20' In Molien, such facts included the negligent conduct of the
doctor and the gravity of a false imputation of syphilis.202 In a by-
stander case, objectively verifiable evidence regarding seriousness
might be provided by fellow employees, associates, friends, family
members, and others who could testify about disruption in a person's
relationships or about an inability to perform his or her usual duties.
In addition, proof that a plaintiff fell within one or more of the Dillon
guidelines might provide a guarantee of genuineness to corroborate a
plaintiffs claim. For example, the fact that a mother helplessly
watched the infliction of death or serious injury on her small child
would tend to corroborate her claim of serious emotional distress.
203
On the other hand, compliance with the Dillon guidelines is not neces-
sary for such corroboration. Moreover, factors not incorporated into
those guidelines, such as Archibald's appalling nature and seriousness
of the injury to a loved one, might provide corroboration. 2°4 In short,
the seriousness criterion permits a wide variety of means of proof. As
Dillon cautioned over a decade ago with respect to the foreseeability
criterion, seriousness must also be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis;
no "immutable rule" can adequately resolve all cases.205
Conclusion
Since Dillon v. Legg,2°6 the California Supreme Court has grap-
pled with the problem of defining a cause of action for bystander emo-
199. See P.S. ATIYAi, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 78 (2d ed. 1975).
UnderMolien, a plaintiffmay prove that his or her emotional distress is severe and debilitat-
ing by establishing its "medically significant nature." 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167
Cal. Rptr. at 839 (quoting Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 172, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970)).
200. 27 Cal. 3d at 930,616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839 (quoting Rodrigues v. State,
52 Hawaii 156, 172, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970)).
201. 27 Cal. 3d at 930-31, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
202. Id
203. See Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980).
204. See Mercado v. Transport of N.J., 176 N.J. Super. 234, 422 A.2d 800 (1980).
205. 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
206. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
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tional distress that would compensate deserving plaintiffs while
avoiding the dangers of fraud, trivial claims, and unlimited liability.
Dillon suggested two devices to assist in this task: the requirement of
physical injury and the guidelines. Subsequent cases have attempted to
refine each device, but each device has proved inadequate. Arbitrary
and unseemly results in emotional distress cases have been the conse-
quence of this experimentation. In contrast, a careful examination of
case law, especially in light of the court's approach to emotional dis-
tress issues in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,20 7 suggests a
means of defining a standard for recovery in bystander cases that will
both meet the concerns implicit in cases such as Justus v. Atchinson
20 8
and allow compensation of deserving plaintiffs.
An examination of the case law suggests that two principles should
govern cases in which persons suffer emotional distress due to fear for
the safety of another-foreseeability and seriousness. Employed to-
gether, these concepts will adequately limit the class of potential
claims. Sanctioning recovery in bystander cases in which emotional
distress is foreseeable and serious conforms the law to the Molien
court's observation that emotional injury that is "as severe and
debilitating as physical harm .. .is no less deserving of redress. ' 20 9
Abstract discussions of emotional distress actions often overlook a fact
that clearly emerges from an examination of appellate cases: emotional
distress results in real, tragic harm and can lead to hospitalization and
incapacitation. The law should recognize the seriousness of this injury
and allow compensation even if a plaintiff fails to meet one of the Dil-
lon guidelines. Dillon envisioned these guidelines only as aids in deter-
mining foreseeability and such is their appropriate use. They need not
be used as rigid duty limitations because the seriousness criterion ade-
quately protects against fraud, trivial claims, and unlimited liability by
requiring severe and debilitating harm. The law would thus identify
injuries whose severity and duration are grievous rather than trivial
and transient. By so doing, recovery would be allowed when it is most
deserving. Moreover, the law would at last conform to Dillon's admo-
nition that the emotional distress issue should be governed by "the gen-
eral rules of tort law, including the concepts of negligence, proximate
207. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
208. 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
209. 27 Cal. 3d at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
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cause, and foreseeability, long applied to other types of injury."210 The
problem would be solved "by the application of the principles of tort,
not by the creation of exceptions to them."21 '
210. 68 Cal. 2d at 746, 441 P.2d at 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
211. Id at 747, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
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